CIAO DATE: 04/2012
Volume: 3, Issue: 2
March 2012
No More Adhocracies: Reforming the Management of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (PDF)
Stuart Bowen
When I interviewed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld for the SIGIR report, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, he leveled this criticism: "The United States lacks a standing capability in the area of (re)construction and there is no long-established team of civilians, let alone a joint-civilian military team, to handle the challenges of major post-conflict tasks." Secretary Rumsfeld's observation complemented Secretary of State's Condoleezza Rice's conclusion about the management of Iraq's reconstruction: "Clearly, we didn't have the right structure." These powerful statements from two powerful leaders who were deeply involved in the policy management of Iraq's reconstruction beg an important question: what has since been done to improve the U.S. capacity to execute stabilization and reconstruction operations (SRO)? The answer? Not enough! I herein propose a solution: the creation of an entity called the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations, which would embody a coherent structure charged with SRO planning, execution, and accountability. Such an organization does not exist today within the U.S. national security architecture. Absent such a reform, the most important lesson from Iraq will be lost to history.
Lost in Translation: The Challenge of Exporting Models of Civil-Military Relations (PDF)
Laura Cleary
In the 21st century, the promotion of civil-military relations has become a critical component of the foreign, defense, and development policies of established democracies. The export of these models has not always proved welcome, however. In seeking to understand why that is the case, this article identifies four contributing factors: 1) the nature of the colonial legacy; 2) the alternative realities of the strategic context; 3) competing concerns in the civil-military relationship; and 4) different cultural reference points. Drawing upon examples from Europe, Asia, and Africa, each of these points will be illustrated in turn.
Taking Stock: Interagency Integration in Stability Operations (PDF)
Caroline Earle
Since 2005, U.S. national policy guidance on stability operations has called for increased civil-military integration. This article explores U.S. Government progress to date on this matter, outlining some of the remaining challenges to include several gaps in the realm of planning and operations. Based upon the current trajectory, the article suggests an uncertain future looking forward. Two major factors will likely influence prospects to address remaining challenges to interagency integration: the State Department’s reform initiatives outlined in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) and budget austerity measures related to the poor state of the economy. These two issues will likely impact further development of civilian capacity for stability operations and with it prospects for interagency integration for stability operations.
After 2015: The Next Security Era for Britain (PDF)
John Mackinlay
Against a background of withdrawal from Afghanistan, the effects of the Arab Spring, economic breakdown in Europe, and the continuing evolution of the techniques of uprising, 2015 may mark the start of a rather different security era for the British. After a century of expeditionary operations, they must now determine whether the safety of their own population takes priority over supporting U.S. operations overseas. Three conditions may define the next security era for them: the probable end of expeditionary operations; the need to give primacy to their domestic security; and the need to develop national security forces and a doctrine which are relevant to the evolutions of insurgency.
Libya: The Transition Clock (PDF)
Julian Lindley-French
These are heady days in Libya. In the wake of the October 21 slaying of former dictator Muammar Gadhafi, the National Transitional Council (NTC) moved quickly to issue a "declaration of liberation". The October 22 announcement effectively abolishes the NTC and lays out a road-map to political transition. This article considers the state of the Libyan transition against five transition end-states and then places the process of political transition on a 12-hour transition clock. In spite of Gadhafi’s death, Libya is at best at 3 o’clock on the transition clock.
Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a Gun: The Taliban's Shadow Government (PDF)
Antonio Giustozzi
The Taliban are in a sense trying to out-govern Kabul rather than outfight it. But what does this mean in practice? The Taliban invest in governors, judges, education, and NGO management, in some cases even with considerable resources. The impact varies, sometimes being very positive (judges), sometimes much less. But in terms of augmenting the popularity of the Taliban, the dividends of this effort have been modest. The real strength of the Taliban is perhaps their ability to effectively mix coercion and co-optation at the village level.
CERP in Afghanistan: Refining Military Capabilities in Development Activities (PDF)
Vijaya Ramachandran, Gregory Johnson, Julie Walz
The U.S. Military has become substantially engaged in the development and stabilization of space and will likely continue to operate in this medium for some time. Since FY02, nearly $62 billion has been appropriated for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan. A large portion of this assistance is committed to economic and social development efforts, which are seen as critical to counterinsurgency efforts and U.S. military stability operations. Funding for one component, the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), currently equals about 5 percent of Afghanistan's GDP. Through our analysis of CERP, we look at the scope and rationale for development-related activities carried out by the U.S. military. Acknowledging that tensions have arisen between the development community and the U.S. military in Afghanistan, we discuss the scope for improving the U.S. military’s capabilities in carrying out development-related activities in in-conflict zones. Specifically, we propose five policy changes: improving education and training for officers, reforming authorities and doctrine, understanding the dominant sectors of the economy, monitoring outcomes, and increasing awareness of unintended consequences.
The Expanded Nontraditional Role of the AFP: A Reassessment (PDF)
Dencio Acop
The experience of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from decades of fighting insurgencies has had both positive and negative consequences for the AFP as an institution and for state-building in the Philippines. Essentially, this article advances the thesis that while the AFP’s unique positive values initially contributed to its increasingly expanded state-building role, its long immersion in its civilian role has ironically diminished its military values. Despite the significant gains derived from the AFP’s long developmental role complementing its traditional role, the impact of the nontraditional role on the AFP is evidenced by recent revelations of massive corruption. Further, the article argues that though seemingly insurmountable, the situation for the Philippine armed forces and state is not entirely without hope. The key to this optimism lies in positive leadership from the very top which the Philippines has now, at least for the next 6 years. The security and development or left-hand/right-hand approach towards winning insurgencies is a time-tested formula. It defeated the first Communist insurgency waged by the Partido Komunistang Pilipinas (PKP) and its military arm, the Hukbalahap. Through Operational Plan Lambat-Bitag, it might have won again in the late eighties had it not been for the lack of developmental follow-through from civilian stakeholders. That the AFP and the Philippine state continue their counterinsurgency strategy along this line is already a giant step in the right direction. Nevertheless, both have yet to win decisively over the CPP/NPA and or the MILF, which are long-running insurgencies
Who Should Lead U.S. Cybersecurity Efforts? (PDF)
Kevin Newmeyer
This article examines the options available to improve cybersecurity leadership within the U.S. Government. At present the authorities are scattered among several departments with weak executive oversight. A strong executive agent is required. This article proposes the establishment of a Director of Cybersecurity (DCYBER) modeled on the Director of National Intelligence. The Director would have the authorities necessary to direct investments and enforce policy along with an empowered Department of Homeland Security.
Dennis Cahill
Beginning in September 2009, the expansion of U.S. Government (USG) civilian agency participation in operations in Afghanistan gave Combined Joint Task Force-82 (CJTF-82) the opportunity to execute “unified action”—a term that describes the wide scope of military and civilian actions that take place under the overall direction of a joint task force commander in Regional Command-East (RC-E). This article provides a historical look at the evolution of Stability Operations (STABOPS) during that timeframe and how CJTF-82/RC-E integrated U.S. Government civilians into its operations. The lessons of unified action and STABOPS in RC-E must be refined and institutionalized so future named operations do not require learning again under fire.
Libya's Operation Odyssey Dawn: Command and Control (PDF)
Joe Quartararo, Sr., Michael Rovenolt, Randy White
On March 19, 2011, U.S. and coalition forces launched Operation Odyssey Dawn to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which called for the establishment of a no-fly zone, enforcement of the arms embargo, and measures to protect Libya's civilians. The operation had a number of complexities, including the involvement of multiple combatant commands, the integration of NATO and non-NATO partners, and the requirement to accomplish the mission using only coalition air and sea forces. This article examines USAFRICOM's response to the Libyan crisis from the period prior to the stand-up of the joint task force, through the conduct of operations, and finally to the transition to NATO lead. The article describes the challenges, best practices, and lessons to inform the current force and future operations; in particular, the challenges of coalition command and control faced by USAFRICOM are described.
The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight (PDF)
Donald Sampler
Two Recent Takes on Where We Are in Afghanistan, and How We Got There (PDF)
James Kunder